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When "Ottumwa Went to the Dogs''
The Erosion of Morrell-Ottumwa's
Militant Unionism, 1954-1973
WILSON J. WARREN
BEGINNING IN THE 1930s, workers' struggles for power
at the John Morrell and Company meatpacking plant in Ot-
tumwa, Iowa, created a militant brand of industrial vmionism.
Morrell workers established United Packinghouse Workers of
America (UPWA) Local No. 1, a strong CIO union built on the
bonds of a homogeneous packing community, anger at Morrell's
unjust labor relations, and workers' desire to exercise more
control in the plant as well as in the community. By the end of
World War E, workers had not only won contractual and in-
formal concessions of power from Morrell, they had also estab-
lished a powerful political presence in the larger community.
Soon after the war, however, Morrell and the local business
community reasserted themselves against Local No. 1. The
struggle for power in plant and community affairs peaked
between the nationwide UPWA meatpacking strike of 1948
and the declaration of "Morrell Days" by the company in 1954.
During those immediate post-World War n years. Local
No. 1 and Morrell battled for control over plant floor decisions.
An early draft of this paper was presented at the 1994 Iowa Heritage Expo.
I thank John Schacht and other participants at the conference for their
comments. I am again grateful to Mark Smith, secretary-treasurer of the Iowa
Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, for allowing me access to and permission to
cite interviews in the Iowa Labor History Oral Project (ILHOP) held by the
State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa. I would also like to thank
Bruce Fehn, Marvin Bergman, and anonymous readers for The Annals of Iowa
for their substantive and editorial suggestions.
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From the mid-1940s to early 1950s, Morrell officials had re-
asserted their prerogatives over production decisions through
the creation of an industrial engineering department and the
appointment of supervisors willing to challenge the union's
power. In December 1953 Morrell's board of directors selected
a new president, W. W. McCallum, the first non-Morrell family
member to be president in the company's 126-year history.
McCallum was bent not only on wresting power away from
Local No. 1 but also on implementing strategies that would
shift production away from the Ottumwa plant. McCallum's
financial and production strategies, combined with changes
prompted by the transformation of the meatpacking industry
in the 1950s and 1960s, undermined Local No. l's militancy.
Internal disputes within Local No. 1 were just as important
in the erosion of the imion's militancy during the 1950s and
1960s. Discord started during and immediately following World
War II, when Morrell hired many rural workers to meet its
expanded labor needs. These and other workers who started
working at the plant following World War II were largely un-
sympathetic to the sentiments underlying Local No. l's militancy.
Largely unaccustomed to unionism and not part of the packing
community traditions of the local's founders, they subverted the
union's efforts to block changes in work rules dictated by the
conipany in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The union would
undergo further fragmentation during the 1960s, when women
workers, whose concerns had long been ignored by the local's
male leadership, battled for job equality in the plant. The ero-
sion of Local No. l's militancy left it virtually powerless when
Morrell prepared to close its Ottumwa plant in the early 1970s.
As one longtime Morrell worker put it, these were the years
when "Ottumwa went to the dogs."^
MORRELL WORKERS in Ottumwa received the first CIO
packinghouse union charter in the United States in May 1937.
In 1943, in recognition of that status, the CIO designated their
local as UPWA Local No. 1, a designation members would point
1. Ray L. Cavin, interview with author, 1982 Morrell Survey, collection in
author's possession.
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to proudly in years to come. The local emerged out of a close-
knit and culturally uniform neighborhood in the immediate
environs of the Morrell plant in Ottumwa's east end. As early
as 1900, 60 percent of Morrell's workers were native-bom of
native parents. By the mid-1930s, over 95 percent of Morrell's
workers were native-bom of northern and western European
stock. Many attended fundamentalist Protestant churches and
belonged to the Eagles, Moose, and American Legion halls
situated in the city's blue-collar residential areas, including
the east end.^
Between 1938 and the end of World War II, Ottumwa's
Morrell workers were able to secure favorable informal pro-
duction rules in key departments of the plant. One of the most
important of those agreements concerned the number of cattle
killed per hour by the floorsmen. Beginning in the late 1930s,
after confrontations stemming from sit-down strikes, the beef
department superintendents and foremen agreed to abide by
limits proposed by workers in the department. Job load issues
were largely resolved this way in many departments through-
out the plant at the same time. As a result, the union exercised
considerable power. In 1942, however, Morrell established a
counteroffensive. The company introduced a new industrial
engineering department that took production decisions away
from departniental supervisors who had previously negotiated
informal production rules with the local union. In 1947 Morrell
also hired a new plant superintendent, Charles L. Campbell,
who directly confronted the urüon over production-related
issues through 1952.^
2. Por more information on Ottumwa's workers' social and cultural identifi-
cation, see Wilson J. Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy:
Structural Pluralism in Midwestem Meatpacking, 1900-1955" (Ph.D. diss..
University of Pittsburgh, 1992), 131-32, 319-20, 330, 604; and idem, "The
Heyday of the CIO in Iowa: Ottumwa's Meatpacking Workers, 1937-1954,"
Annals of Iowa 51 (1992), 365-67.
3. On the history of union-management conflict in Morrell's Ottumwa plant
between 1937 and 1954, see Warren, "The Heyday of the CIO in Iowa," 363-89.
For a more detailed account of this coriflict, see Warren, "The Limits of New
Deal Social Democracy," 295-351, 516-70. For detailed accounts of the estab-
lishment of the beef department job load and other informal production rules,
see Virgil Barücson, interview with author, 26 September 1982; and interview
220 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
During that six-year period, Campbell and the industrial
engineering department initiated many changes in work rules,
most of which increased job loads. For exam.ple, beginning in
1949, Morrell demanded that Ottumwa's beef kill department
slaughter twice as many cattle per hour as the company's Sioux
Falls plant did with the same number of men. Union officials
in Ottumwa complained that Morrell unfairly targeted Ottumwa's
CIO work force while avoiding antagonizing Sioux Falls's more
cooperative Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
(AMCBW-AFL) work force. In this case, Campbell told the
Ottumwa local that if they did not like the job load situation,
then "why don't you strike?" Throughout this period, the local
used wildcat strikes to combat the changes in work rules. The
battles reached a peak in 1951, when there were eighty-eight
separate walkouts at the Ottumwa plant.*
On the heels of these repeated and massive walkouts,
UPWA District No. 3 Director Russell Bull, at the urging of
with Paul Kelso, 1978, Iowa Labor History Project (ILHOP), State Historical
Society of Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City; Art Bankson, interview with author, 17 May
1983; Paul Bissell, interviews with author, 10 January 1983 and 25 November
1984; Dorothy Daeges, interview with author, 9 September 1982; George Gail,
interview with author, 13 January 1983; Donald Jones, interview with Leslie
Orear, 14 January 1974, Local P-1 Records, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America (AMCBW-NA, AFL-CIO), SHSI; and
Donald Jones, interview, 20 October 1978, ILHOP. Although workers ex-
pressed their desire for more control in other respects as well, their nülitant
solidarity is akin to the "mood of syndicalism" that Bruce Nelson describes
among Pacific Coast waterfront workers in Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen,
Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s (Urbana, IL, 1988).
4. The 1949 job load controversy is described in The Bulletin, 14 April, 2 and
16 May, 6 and 20 June, 13,18, and 25 July, 15 August, and 19 September 1949,
folder 7, box 411, UPWA Records, State Historical Society of Wisconsin
(SHSW), Madison, Wisconsin; John Morrell and Co. Executive Department
Annoimcement, 16 April 1949, ibid.; Edward Filliman, UPWA field repre-
sentative, weekly reports, 30 April, 7 and 21 May, 11,18, and 25 June, 2 and
30 July, 6 August, 10 September, 22 October, 5, 12, and 26 November 1949,
ibid.; Russell Bull, UPWA District 3 assistant director, to Ralph Helstein,
UPWA president, 9 May and 16 June 1949, folder 5, ibid.; and National Pro-
visioner, 17 December 1949. See also Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social
Democracy," 554-55; and idem, "The Heyday of the CIO in Iowa," 384-86.
For a discussion of the national context of wildcat strikes and walkouts dur-
ing the late 1940s, see George Lipsitz, Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture
in the 1940s (Urbana, IL, 1994), 229-52.
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some segments of Local No. l's membership, placed the local
under receivership, giving district officials authority over the
local's operation. Bull himself had participated in the local's
fight against Morrell on the job load issue since 1949 and had
grown tired of it. In the fall of 1952, Bull selected Bud Simonson
as deputy admirüstrator of Local No. 1. Simonson's presence
helped to clamp down on the union's militancy. The temporary
lull in labor-management conflict that ensued allowed new Mor-
rell president McCallum and Local No. 1 to fashion a symbolic
truce at a commimity-wide "Morrell Days" celebration in April
1954. Dissension in the local union's ranks had for the time being
prompted the union to adopt a less confrontational posture.^
The conflict, however, exacerbated an already combative
relationship between Local No. 1 and the UPWA international
and distirict offices. In 1941, for example, the national Packing-
house Workers Organizing Committee (forenmner of the UPWA-
CIO) had chastised the local for using plant bulletin boards to
criticize Morrell harshly for encouraging workers not to pay
their membership dues. Following World War II, the UPWA
international became disgusted when Local No. 1 avoided the
union's national civil rights program. Even before the receiver-
ship was implemented, local imion officials felt that neither the
international nor district office was willing to continue the job
load fight.*
5. On the 1952-53 receivership issue, see Regular Membership Meeting min-
utes, 28 October and 19 November 1952, and 18 February 1953, box 11,
Local P-1 Records, State Historical Society of Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City, Iowa.
Jack McCoy, interview, Othimwa, 18 May 1983, Iowa Labor History Oral
Project (ILHOP), SHSI, also recounts the 1952 receivership controversy, albeit
in a somewhat biased fashion since he was one of the local union leaders
opposed to the walkouts and the union's militancy. The receivership appears
to have been lifted by March 1953.
6. On Local No. l's increasingly acrimonious relationship with UPWA inter-
national and district officials, see William Houston, U.S. Commissioner of
Conciliation, to John Doherty, PWOC vice-chairman, 8 February 1941, folder
11, box 306; Doherty to Lewis J. Clark, PWOC District 3 director, 10 February
1941, folder 11, box 306; Packinghouse Worker, 25 September 1942; "Agreement
of John Morrell and Co. and The Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee,
Locals No. 1 and 174," 3 April 1943, folder 2, box 192; Russell Bull to Ralph Hel-
stein, UPWA president, 14 February 1949, folder 2, box 411; Edward Filliman,
weekly reports, 26 March, 30 April, 7 May 1949, 2 and 30 December 1950, 6
January, 10 February, 7 July, and 17 November 1951, folder 7, box 411, and
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To be sure, many UPWA local unions' relations with the
intemational office became strained following World War II,
partly because of the union's losing battle in its 1948 nation-
wide strike. The UPWA had gained a 16-cents-per-hour increase
following its 1946 strike, but after a long and bitter strike in 1948,
the union, which had pushed for a twenty-nine-cents-per-hour
increase, settled for nine cents. In Omaha, local union officials
had expressed ambivalence about the need for a strike even
before it began. Then once it did begin, workers attacked each
other over left-wing ideological issues. Whites often blamed
black workers for crossing picket lines. Omaha's packers, es-
pecially Wilson, exacerbated internal union tensions by granting
replacement workers seniority (so-called "superseniority") over
the UPWA strikers when they returned to work. Other UPWA
cities experienced similar internal union problems. Racial antag-
onisms troubled Local No. 58 at the Armour plant in St. Joseph,
Missouri, during the 1948 strike and long after. Whites only
reluctantly worked with blacks in the union. Local No. 174 in
Topeka saw about one-half of its members, most of whom were
native-bom whites, join a back-to-work movement during the
strike, then drop their union membership immediately following
its conclusion. The core Topeka unionists, consisting primarily
of Volga Germans, African Americans, and Mexican Americans,
only fitfully pieced their local back together. The UPWA inter-
national's civil rights program, implemented in the aftermath
of the 1948 strike and aimed at overcoming some of the racial
tensions that had obviously disrupted its strike effort, often
further divided whites and blacks instead of creating more
harmonious relations.^
folder 13, box 415; Filliman to Russell Bull, [August 1951], folder 7, box 411;
Filliman, "Comments," [September 1951], folder 13, box 415; all in UPWA
Records; and Virgil Bankson, interview with author, 26 September 1982.
7. For a more complete discussion of the internal union conflicts in Omaha,
St. Joseph, and Topeka following the 1948 strike, see Warren, "The Limits of
New Deal Social Democracy," chaps. 7-9. On the 1948 strike and its aftermath
in other UPWA locals, see Eric Brian Halpern, "'Black and White Unite and
Fight': Race and Labor in Meatpacking, 1904-1948" (Ph.D. diss.. University
of Pennsylvania, 1989), 526-43; and Roger Horowitz, "The Path Not Taken:
A Social History of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-1960" (Ph.D.
diss.. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1990), 546-632.
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IN OTTUMWA, internal urüon conflict also stemmed partly
from growing discord among the rank and file. However, the
sources of conflict in Ottumwa differed from the racial and
ideological animosities evident in Omaha, St. Joseph, Topeka,
and elsewhere. Instead, Ottumwa's friction occurred between
urban and rural whites. Morrell hired rural residents to meet
its expanded production needs during World War II. Iri 1935
none of the plant's workers lived outside the city limits. Sixteen
years later, however, 27 percent did so. These rural residents
were not incorporated into the thoroughly unionized culture of
Ottumwa's east end, where an intersecting network of church
and fraternal affiliations reinforced union loyalties. Rural em-
ployees of Morrell provided a disproporfionate number of the
"scabs" who disrupted the union's effort in the crucial 1948
strike. In 1951, at the height of the union's postwar production
struggles with Morrell, Edward Fiiliman, a former local uruon
chief steward who became a UPWA internafional representative
in 1949, accused Morrell of hiring rural workers to break the
union's solidarity.*
Another important source of internal vmion strife was the
growing division between the union's pioneers, such as Fiili-
man, and the men and women who came into the union's ranks
during and immediately following World War 11. Jack McCoy,
for instance, started working full fime at the plant in 1949 as a
20-year-old fresh out of military service. Admitfing that he was
mofivated in part by dislike of hard, physical work, McCoy got
involved in local imion polifics in 1950 and became recording
secretary in 1953. In 1954 McCoy was selected as one of Local
No. l's representafives to the Ottumwa Industrial Union Coimcil
before being elected that fall to represent Wapello County in the
Iowa House of Representafives. McCoy attributed the tensions
between the older militants and younger members in Local
No. 1 to three factors. First, McCoy cited Filliman's polifical
ambifions, calling him a "junior size John L. [Lewis]." McCoy
8. On the impact of rural workers in the Morrell plant and its union politics,
see Warren, "The Heyday of the CIO in Iowa," 375,381-83,385-86; and idem,
"The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy," 525-30,541-44,557-58. For more
on Edward Fiiliman, see Morrell Magazine, December 1948, 1.
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also resented hot-headed local stewards, some of whom he
claimed led walkouts just so they could go "squirrel hunting."
Finally, while many prewar urüon activists viewed unionism
as a kind of "religion" that would reshape power relations in
the plant and the local community, McCoy believed that his
generation of younger workers simply wanted to work to put
bread on the table for their families.'
A significant subtheme of McCoy's characterization of the
pro-Filliman faction was his dislike of their drinking habits.
He believed that too often Filliman and his compatriots (in-
cluding William Fletcher, first president of the local and the
local's president again in 1952, and Harold "Cap" [or "Cappy"]
Carson, a local union officer since World War II) plotted their
walkouts from two beer "joints," Walker's and Champ's, located
across the street from the plant. It is no coincidence that Walter
Walker and Orvel Champ, whose families ran those bars, had
helped to organize the CIO local at the plant and had been
among its first officers.'"
As later events would make more evident, however, McCoy's
observation signified a deeper (and more damaging) gulf in atü-
tudes between the remaining core of old-fime, militant activists,
whose attitudes about Morrell had been shaped in the pre-
World War II years, and the new generation, including workers
like McCoy, who had started in the plant during or immediately
after the war. In particular, the older, militant lordonists feared
that any deviation from their hardline stance against the com-
pany would result in a retum to the "old days." Years later,
men in the older, militant camp—men such as Virgil Bankson,
a longtime chief steward—would describe with an undertone
of fear and hatred the arbitrary and calloused treatment they
received before the rise of the urüon. In the eyes of younger
workers who had not experienced the pre-imion period at the
9. On the 1930s generation's sources of unionism and union ideology, see
Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy," chap. 6, esp. 328-49.
On McCoy, see Regular Membership Meeting Minutes, 18 February 1953, box
11, Local P-1 Records; The Bulletin (UPWA Local No. l's weekly newspaper),
25 January 1954, box 23, Local P-1 Records; Morrell Magazine, January 1955,
12; and Packinghouse Worker, February 1955,11.
10. Jack McCoy, interview, Waterloo, 18 May 1983, ILHOP.
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Morrell plant, the older, more militant unionists seemed moti-
vated more by vindictiveness and revenge against the company
than by a desire for social justice."
The generational gap overlapped with differences arising
from the urban versus rural distribution of the work force.
The older, more militant workers still tended to reside in the
immediate plant environs of Ottumwa's east end, whereas
many more recently hired employees (including younger union
officials such as McCoy) lived across the river on Ottumwa's
south side or outside of town. These sources of discord would
continue to resonate in the union's internal politics throughout
the 1950s, especially in the face of the policies that Morrell's
new top official pursued.
WHEN W. W. "WALLY" MCCALLUM became president
of Morrell in 1953, he was not only the first non-Morrell family
member in that posifion in the company's long history, he was
also the first top official since Morrell had arrived in Ottumwa
in 1877 who did not make his home there. Consequently, work-
ers could no longer use the comparatively extravagant local
lifestyle of its top official as an emotional rallying point as they
had done when the Foster family was in control.^^ McCallum's
11. Local No. 32 Picnic Program, 15 August 1937, UPWA Local P-3 Records,
SHSI (which includes a list of the first officers of Ottumwa Packinghouse
Workers' Organizing Committee [PWOC] Local No. 32, which later became
UPWA Local No. 1); and McCoy, interview. Virgil Bankson's sentiments
about the pre-union era of labor-management relations can be gleaned from
his ILHOP interviews, 18 October 1978 and 11 March 1983. Filliman made
the reason for his militancy clear in a September 1951 report to the UPWA
international office. "You may say [that continued walk-outs are] not justified,
but I say the men were right. I helped break down this kind of [arbitrary
work] assignment and condition years ago. [This] was one of the big deals
when we organized our union[.] [T]his is a fighting deal, [as] this old company
method . . . was one of the things that brought on unionism. . . . [We] have
to fight to keep from going back to those days again. See folder 13, box 415,
UPWA Records.
12. Thomas Dove Foster, son-in-law of the company's founder, George Morrell,
established the Ottumwa plant in 1877 and was Morrell's president until his
death in 1915. T. D. Foster's second son, Thomas Henry Foster, was president
of the company from 1921 to 1944; the third son, George Morrell Foster, was
president from 1944 to 1952; and the fourth son, John Morrell Foster, was
226 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
lack of experience toiling with meat or handling packing work-
ers represented another contrast with the Fosters. McCallum
had been Oscar Mayer's accountant and president's assistant
since 1938, but unlike the Fosters, who had always worked in
the plant for at least a token stint of hands-on experience be-
fore assuming top managerial positions, McCallum's financial
wizardry was his sole credential. When he met with the local
union executive board and stewards soon after his ascension
to Morrell's top position, McCallum "stressed the fact that he
wishe[d] to see a closer harmony between the employees and
the company." Nevertheless, at the supposedly conciliatory
"Morrell Days" celebration in April 1954, he made an implicit
(and threatening) connection between Morrell's finances and
its workers' militancy. "The Ottumwa plant," he said, "is, in
a sense, at a standstill. We are killing hogs and cattle, pro-
cessing and selling good meat products, paying wages and so
forth—but the plant is losing money—and has been losing
consistently over the last six years," that is, since the 1948
strike and its subsequent repercussions in labor-management
relations."
McCallum's "solution" for company losses was threefold:
he began bujâng plants around the country, moved the com-
pany's general headquarters from Ottumwa to Chicago in De-
cember 1955, and continued to contest the union's power to in-
fluence production decisions. The first two decisions stemmed
president from 1952 to 1953. W. H. T. Foster, T. D.'s oldest son, managed the
Sioux Falls Morrell plant from 1913 to 1939. T. D., T. H., G. M., and J. M.
Foster all lived in Ottumwa. The Fosters were the preeminent family of wealth,
power, and fashion in Ottumwa for the first half of the twentieth century.
Lawrence Oakley Cheever, The House of Morrell (Cedar Rapids, 1948); and
R. Ames Montgomery, Thomas D. Poster: A Biography (Cedar Rapids, 1930),
convey some of the Foster family's history.
13. On the significance of Morrell/Foster family members living in Ottumwa
for increasing worker resentment, see Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social
Democracy," 31&-19; and Warren, "The Heyday of the CIO," 367. In his ILHOP
interview. Jack McCoy recalled the Foster family's ostentatious displays of
wealth and their "down the nose attitude" toward the people of Ottumwa.
Segments of this part of the interview are quoted in Shelton Stromquist,
Solidarity and Survival: An Oral History of Iowa Labor in the Twentieth Century
(Iowa City, 1993), 54-55. On McCallum, see Morrell Magazine, January 1954, 3;
April 1954, 5; December 1958, 7; and The Bulletin, February 1954.
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from McCallum's desire to follow the traditional financial path
of the Big Four meatpacking plants: establish a high-volume
sales empire of plants, all controlled from America's central
packing hub, Chicago. Swift, Armour, Cudahy, and Wilson had
traditionally garnered sizable profits, in an industry t)^ified by
very slim profit ratios, by slaughtering and processing meat at
as many plants as possible. In hopes of mimicking their suc-
cess, Morrell purchased thirteen small plants throughout the
Midwest and South between August 1954 and February 1963.
Most were nonunion and paid relatively low wages, but they
did boost Morrell's total sales from just over $300 million in
1954 to $554 million in 1961. During the same period, Morrell
also acquired financial interests in Foxbilt, a livestock feed and
hybrid corn producer, and Golden Sun Mill, another livestock
feed manufacturer.^*
McCallum's decision to pursue such a strategy would prove
to be antiquated, however, once Iowa Beef Processors' revolu-
tionary combination of more isolated, rural slaughtering facili-
ties, nonunion work forces, and streamlined, on-rail, boxed-beef
technology rapidly transformed meatpacking (and its profit
margins) beginning in 1961. When Currier Holman and Andy
Anderson started their Denison, Iowa, plant, meatpacking was
still largely typified by urban midwestern locations where ani-
mals were shipped on the "hoof," although the transition from
urban to rural locations to decrease shipping costs had been
occurring gradually since the end of World War I. IBP's real
innovations were in the introduction of highly automated as-
sembly line production techniques in combination with the
development of "boxed" beef. Various firms had introduced
automated techniques piecemeal in the 1950s but not in the
integrated way that IBP did. Boxed beef referred to the cutting
of beef carcass quarters into marketable cuts at the plant in-
stead of having retail butchers handle this step as had been the
traditional practice. Most of the old-line plants were imionized
14. On McCallum's financial strategy for Morrell, see National Provisioner, 21
August 1954, 25; Morrell Magazine, September 1954, 3; July 1955, 6; January
1956, 10; February 1956, 11; June 1956, 3; October 1959, 2; January 1960, 2;
May 1960,2; January 1962,2; June 1962,4; January-February 1963,2; January-
February 1964, 3; and May-June 1964, 15.
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as well, whereas, partly because IBP's technical processes did
not require skilled labor, they could hire unskilled, nonurüorüzed
workers. Much to the surprise of Morrell and other tradifional
packers, IBP's integrated producfion practices soon left them
scram^bling to innovate or be eliminated as compefitors.^^
Besides choosing outdated financial and producfion strate-
gies, McCallum exacerbated volafile employee relations at the
plant by selecting Harry E. Hansel Jr. to help manage the con-
frontafional industrial relafions department that Charles "Mad
Dog" Campbell had administered from 1947 to 1952. "Kid"
Hansel, as the old-fime urüonists derisively called him, had
started working at the Ottumwa plant in 1940. In 1942 he was
transferred to the new industrial engineering department. Over
the next decade, he helped to establish fime studies and gain
fime to challenge Local No. l's power to control producfion
decisions. Gain fime, in parficular, became an effecfive weapon
that management wielded to deflect workers' allegiances away
from Local No. 1. Essenfially, gain fime was a variafion on the
old Frederick Winslow Taylor nofion of incenfive pay (or piece-
work) that allowed employees to work shorter hours for the
same pay as long as they met the producfion standard for the
job. In effect, workers who parficipated in gain fime pracficed
a self-induced job speedup. Through 1960, when he was trans-
ferred away from Ottumwa, Hansel, as operafions manager and
assistant manager of a revamped industrial relafions depart-
15. Sources describing the traditional financial strategies of the Big Four
packers include Richard J. Arnould, "Changing Patterns of Concentration in
American Meat Packing, 1880-1963," Business History Review 45 (1971), 18-34;
Jimmy M. Skaggs, Prime Cut: Livestock Raising and Meatpacking in the United
States, 1607-1983 (College Station, TX, 1986); Mary Yeager, Competition and
Regulation: The Development of Oligopoly in the Meat Packing Industry (Greenwich,
CT, 1981); and Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy," 41-55,
66-72. IBP awaits its historian, but crucial historical information is available
in a series of articles Dale Kasler wrote for the Des Moines Register, 18-25
September 1988. Many management employees of Morrell communicated
their criticisms of McCallum's financial strategy to me over the years.
Lawrence Reedquist, a traffic engineer at Morrell for nearly fifty years,
described McCallum's objective of buying old plants instead of constructing
new ones as pushing Morrell's fortunes from "bad to worse" during the 1950s
and 1960s. Reedquist, interview with author, 11 August 1981 (notes in author's
possession).
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ment, wholeheartedly protected the practice of gain fime and
gain fimers themselves.^^
McCallum and Hansel's continued assaults on the local
union's power to affect workplace decisions resulted in a re-
surgence of union aggressiveness beginning in 1955. "Cap"
Carson, Local No. 1 president in 1955 and 1956, led a new
charge by the old-time militant faction of the work force against
management's directives. In The Bulletin, the union's newspaper,
leadership waged a propaganda battle, as fierce as the one it
had conducted in 1949-1952, against Morrell and its policies.
The paper attacked "Kid" Hansel in particular, accusing him of
undermining the union contract, including seniority provisions.^^
During the first half of 1956, virtually the same group of
older, militant officers from 1955 continued to press Morrell on
gain time. Union officials recalled the period from 1949 to 1952,
when workers had been fired for failing to meet new produc-
tion standards. They urged the rank and file to resist gain time
incentives, because new standards could result in further job
losses and consequent loss of vmion power. As evidence. Local
No. 1 officials pointed to Morrell's shutdown of the dog food
manufacturing department in December 1955 based on time
study conclusions. The department was small, but they believed
the same thing would happen soon all over the plant. ^ ^
Officials also noted the deceit of the company slogan adopted
at the 1954 "Morrell Days" celebration—"Morrell Needs You
and You Need Morrells"—in light of the new company policy
of discharging employees or delaying sick pay for absenteeism
16. For details about Harwel's career, see Morrell Magazine, March 1944, 8;
August 1955, 6; October 1956, 8; and September 1962, 3. Harry Braverman's
Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century
(New York, 1974) contains one of the most fully developed treatments of
Frederick Taylor's concept of piecework and incentive pay. See also Stromquist,
Solidarity and Survival, 191-99, for a more complete discussion of the wide-
spread use of incentives and gain time in Iowa factories after World War 11.
17. The Bulletin, 31 January, 23 March, and 2 May 1955. Although not indic-
ative of the internal divisior« affecting local union politics. Jack McCoy's
election to the state legislature on the Democratic ticket in November 1954
did indicate labor's remaining powerful local presence in Ottumwa and
Wapello County. See Packinghouse Worker, February 1955, 11.
18. The Bulletin, 9 and 25 January and 5 March 1956.
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and tardiness. In fact, umon leaders claimed that tactic was
simply another union-busting technique. They felt Morrell's
underlying attitude was "LET'S BREAK THIS DAMN UNION AND
RUN THE COMPANY THE WAY WE SEE FIT."^'
AFTER MANY OF LOCAL NO. l's newer members complained
that urüon militancy was spiraling out of control, Russell Bull
again placed the union in receivership. Unlike the case in 1952,
however. Bull placed a prominent member of the new genera-
tion of workers at Morrell, Dave Hart, in charge as deputy
admirustrator. Although all of the 1956 officers were retained
for the remainder of the year. The Bulletin's rhetoric became
much less antagonistic toward Morrell. Then, in the local's 1957
elections, most of the older militants lost to members of the new
generation. Five of the nine local officers were new in 1957, with
the two key changes occurring in the positions of president and
chief steward. In runoff elections Tom Cohagan defeated "Cap"
Carson for local union president and Louis Crûmes defeated Art
Johnson for chief steward. In contrast to the new generation of
officials, Johnson, like Carson, was a longtime Morrell employee.
Born in Blekinge, Sweden in 1903, he started at Morrell in 1922
and worked in the mechanical department. Crûmes had served
as Local No. l's vice-president in 1953, when, under UPWA
District No. 3 receivership, Dave Hart had served as chief stew-
ard, Lester Bishop had been president, and Bob Mclntosh had
been secretary-treasurer. Mclntosh was then elected to the same
union office in 1957. Just one of the nine 1957 officers lived in
the east end packing district neighborhood, whereas both "Cap"
Carson and Art Johnson did.^"
Local No. l's new presiderit, Tom Cohagan, was a promi-
nent member of the new generafion of Morrell workers who.
19. Ibid., 24 May 1956 (the quotation was in all caps in the source.)
20. Local No. 1 Special Executive Board Meeting, 8 June 1956, box 11, Local
P-1 Records; The Bulletin, 28 January 1957; 3 February 1953 membership
meeting, box 11, Local P-1 Records; Arthur G. Johnson obituary (died 14
January 1991), Ottumwa Courier, Morrell-Ottumwa workers obituary file, in
author's possession; and Polk's Ottumwa City Directory, 1957. In his ILHOP
interview. Jack McCoy characterized both Dave Hart and Lester Bishop as
leaders of the "new" generation of anti-Filliman local union officials.
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like Jack McCoy, wanted more stable relations with manage-
ment. Born in Knoxville, Iowa, and educated in Des Moines,
Cohagan had not been part of the union-building struggles at
Morrell in Ottumwa during the 1930s. First employed at Morrell
in 1939, Cohagan was in military service for a good part of the
World War 11 period. Like Jack McCoy, he became active in
local union politics when he returned to the plant. His opposi-
tion to Filliman first became evident in 1951. Filliman, in one
of his weekly UPWA field representative reports, noted that
Cohagan, as Local No. 1 recording secretary, had been corre-
sponding with Lewis Clark, a prominent UPWA international
officer (as w e^ll as a vocal anticommunist) about the current
chaos in the Ottumwa plant. Filliman noted with disgust that
Cohagan's views were "purely personal" and did not represent
the views of all local unionists (including, of course, Filliman's).
Cohagan's clandestine correspondence with Clark seems to have
kept him out of local union offices for the next several years,
even during 1953, when many other newer and less combative
workers first had an opportimity to hold office.^ ^
Not surprisingly. Local No. l's new officers in 1957 immedi-
ately toned down much of the militant rhetoric of The Bulletin.
For instance, the February 18 issue asked union members to
follow the correct sick pay procedures. The spirit of the brief
article was that the local union needed to comply more coopera-
tively with the general provisions of its contract with Morrell.
Nevertheless, regarding gain time, the new leadership continued
the older, more militant leaders' viewpoint. A May 6 article in
21. Tom Cohagan obituary (died 3 May 1989), Ottumwa Courier, Morrell-
Ottumwa obituary file; Edward Filliman, UPWA field representative weekly
report, 23 June 1951, folder 13, box 415, UPWA Records. For more on Lewis
Clark's anticommunism and his role in the internal politics of the UPWA
international, see Regular Membership Meeting, 6 January 1937, Midwest
Union of All Packinghouse Workers, 1936-37 Minute Book, Local No. 3
Records, SHSI; Virgil Bankson, interview with author, 26 September 1982;
Don Harris, interview, 8 June 1978, ILHOP; Herbert March, interview, 21
October 1986, United Packinghouse Workers of America Oral History Project
(UPWAOHP); Norman Dolnick, interview, 1 October 1985, UPWAOHP; Ed
Roche to Herbert March, 11 September 1945, folder 1, box 308, UPWA Records;
Clark to March, 7 November 1945, ibid.; Philip Weightman to March, 10 April
1946, ibid.; March to Weightman, 18 April 1946, ibid.; Clark to March, 29 April
1946, ibid.; March to Clark, 8 May 1946, ibid.
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The Bulletin asked the rank and file not to use the incentive
system since "greed cuts [your] brothers throat" and denies
work to everyone.^
By May 1957, the older militants in Local No. 1 attempted
to regain power. At the imion's regular membership meeting
on May 14, a motion by John Bedner, vice-president of the local
in 1955 and a member of the local's bargaining board in 1956,
seconded by Art Johnson, proposed to lift the local's receiver-
ship. The motion carried. A similar proposal carried at a special
executive board meeting of the local two days later. Over the
next couple of weeks, however, as the UPWA district office
stalled on the local's request, the older militants heard rumors
that Tom Cohagan, on orders from Dave Hart, was planning
to print a detailed plea for retaining the local's receivership.
Sure enough, this plea, printed in the Jxme 3 issue of The Bul-
letin, noted that the "old tmion leaders, many of whom were
recently defeated," wanted to lift the administratorship, without
which, from Cohagan's point of view, the local would return
to the "old days when 87 [sic] work stoppages took place."^
With UPWA District No. 3 Director Russell Bull himself
in attendance, the union's vote that night demonstrated the
ascendancy of the new generation's views among the rank and
file. Their support for retaining the receivership carried by a
landslide vote of 482 to 170. Art Johnson asked that the secret
vote be made standing, so each person's position on the internal
union struggle would be evident to all, but Russell Bull inter-
vened and "demanded a secret ballot." Bull's position helped
restrain what might have become an exacerbated internal union
fight, but it also suggests that UPWA District No. 3 as well as
the UPWA intemational were increasingly interested in pro-
moting local union malleability.^*
22. The Bulletin, 18 February and 6 May 1957.
23. Regular Membership Meeting, 14 May 1957; Special Executive Board
Meeting, 16 May and 1 June 1957; and The Bulletin, 3 June 1957.
24. Given declining rank-and-file participation in virtually all union activities
in the 1950s, the 23 percent turnout for the vote (652 total ballots cast out of
about 2,800 members) on receivership indicates a fairly high level of interest
in union affairs at the Ottumwa plant. See Special Membership Meeting Min-
utes, 3 June 1957, box 11, Local P-1 Records, SHSL For Local No. 1 member-
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Over the next several years, members of Morrell's new
generafion gradually solidified their dominance in Local No. 1.
After another narrow runoff victory over "Cap" Carson in 1958,
Tom Cohagan remained local president unfil 1963. By 1962, the
only members among the rune top officials with fies to the older
militants were Virgil Bankson, chief steward, and John Bednar,
bargairung board member. Although The Bulletin became less
combafive, especially in regard to producfion decisions, it none-
theless retained a concern about the corrosive effects of gain fime.
One general reprimand of gain fimers suggested that workers
used their free fime for sexual encounters in the parking lots.
The article claimed that news of the this abuse "could break up
many marriages if all the facts were exposed." Hansel was also
regularly chided for protecfing gain fimers even at the risk of
sparking "open war with the ^^
LOCAL NO. l 's declining militancy dovetailed with changes
in the structure of the work force, many of which were related
to shifts in workers' residential patterns. Morrell's demolition
and burning of many remaining, though largely vacant, houses
in the near east end during the summer of 1962 epitomized the
end of the historic connecfion between Morrell's militant union
tradifion and residence in the plant's environs. Morrell proudly
described its destrucfion of the remaining houses next to the
plant in an arficle fitled "Urban Renewal" in the company
magazine. In 1935, 39 percent of Morrell's workers had lived
in the east end. By 1957, only 22 percent did, and by 1965 just
15 percent would live there. On the other hand, the proporfion
of Morrell employees who lived outside the city limits went
from zero in 1935 to 33 percent in 1965. To be sure, by 1962
much of the older tension between the east enders and the out-
ship figures from 1952 to 1960, see folder 7, box 492, UPWA Records. On the
UPWA's increasing concern in the 1950s for local union tractability, see
Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social Democracy," chap. 10.
25. The Bulletin, 30 September and 14 October 1957,29 January and 22 Decem-
ber 1958, 30 January 1961, and 19 January 1962. An interesting illustration of
the changing concerns of Local No. l's membership was the formation of the
Iowa Avenue Club in May 1957 for workers interested in stock market invest-
ments. See Morrell Magazine, March 1960, 3.
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of-towners was gone largely because the local imion itself no
longer contested company production decisions. Yet local union
leaders' irritation about the importation of workers from outside
Ottumwa was still evident enough in 1962 when The Bulletin
noted that McCallum had been quoted as saying "out of town-
ers are more efficient than Ottumwa people if they were hired
in the last nine years" (that is, since the begirming of his tenure
as president). Company officials lauded the progress they saw in
replacing old east end homes with parking lots, a project made
both possible and necessary because of ti\e transition in em-
ployees' places of residence. After the demolifion and burrüng,
Morrell officials claimed that more than ten acres of parking
were available to plant employees!^*
The number of people employed in the Ottumwa plant had
been affected by Morrell's use of new technologies in combina-
tion with gain time since the early post-World War II years.
Yet wholesale job losses at the Ottumwa plant did not cause
widespread tension among workers until the early 1960s. Al-
though 39,100 jobs were eliminated in meatpacking throughout
the United States between 1956 and 1961, union membership
at Morrell remained constant through most of the 1950s. As the
pace of technological innovation picked up in the early 1960s,
however, there were job losses at Morrell as well as at many
other "old-line" meatpackers. Paul Bissell, beef department
superintendent beginning in 1956 after working his way up
through the ranks in the beef kill starting in 1930, recalled that
new technologies transformed Ottumwa's beef killing process
only after 1961. Until that date, "as far as beef operations were
concerned, little had changed back to the '30s. "^ ^
26. Morrell Magazine, August 1962, 7; and The Bulletin, 17 December 1962.
My calculatior\s of workers' residences are based on systematic samples of
the 1935 McCoy's Ottumwa City Directory, 1957 Polk's Ottumwa City Direc-
tory, and 1965 Polk's Ottumwa City Directory. I am defining the east end as
corresponding to precincts one and two as described in Ordinance No. 1313
of the 1934 revision of Ottumwa's Municipal Code.
27. On the combination of technology and gain time used by Morrell to shut
down many departments, see Ethel Jerred, interview, Ottumwa, 5 October
1981, ILHOP. Between 1952 and 1957, Local No. l 's total membership ranged
between 2,700 and 2,950. It then fell to 2,400 in 1958 before recovering a bit
to just over 2,500 in 1960. See folder 7, box 497, UPWA Records. I interviewed
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Although The Bulletin emphasized losses in traditionally
male-dominated departments such as the beef kill, some of
the hardest hit departments, such as sliced bacon, had been
predominately female. Unfortunately for those women. Local
No. 1, like most UPWA locals, had adopted a system of de-
partmental, as opposed to plantwide, seniority in order to
prevent management's arbitrary transfer of workers, particu-
larly union activists, from department to department. Because
most packing departments were sex-segregated, this meant that
women had little opportvinity to "bump" into male-dominated
departments when technological innovations eliminated many
women s jobs.
By 1964-65, more layoffs and continued pressure from
longtime women employees presented Local No. l's leadership
with a dilemma. How could they help women union members
without alienating male workers, especially when men had
long dominated the plant's work force and were its most
ardent union activists? In 1935, women constituted just 9 per-
cent of Morrell's work force compared to 15 percent in 1951
arid 14 percent in 1957. Only one woman (Mary Shoemaker
from the sausage department) had ever been elected an official
of Local No. 1. Moreover, most of the local's union leaders were
admittedly sexist. Jesse Merrill, a hog kill worker and presi-
dent of Local No. 1 from 1967 until the plarit closed in 1973,
claimed he had long believed that "if the man's head of the
house he should have the job." Virgil Bankson, Local No. l's
chief steward during the 1960s, was even more adamantly
Paul Bissell on 10 January 1983 (notes in my possession). On the restructuring
and job cuts in meatpacking, see Fehn, "'Chickens Come Home to Roost':
Industrial Reorganization, Seniority, and Gender Conflict in the United
Packinghouse Workers of America, 1956-1966," Labor History 34 (1993), 333,
341. The Bulletin described job losses due to technological and time study
changes in its issues of 11 and 25 March 1963, and 30 March 1964. See also
"Facts and Figures," vol. 14, no. 21, 27 July 1961, folder 14, box 513, UPWA
Records.
28. For analyses of the impact of technological innovations in the meatpacking
industry on women's employment and concerns, see Bruce Fehn, "Striking
Women: Gender, Race, and Class in the United Packinghouse Workers of
America (UPWA), 1938-1968" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Wisconsin-Madison,
1991), chap. 6; and idem, "'Chickens Come Home to Roost,'" 324-41.
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against giving "men's jobs" to women. He claimed "there's
more divorces over women taking men's jobs than anything
else." In the face of such attitudes, women started attending
local uruon meetings en masse in 1964-65 to protest the union's
continuing conunitment to departmental serüority, but they
made little headway with union leaders.^'
After getting nowhere with the local, thirty women con-
tacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in
Washington, D.C. The Washington ofHce told them to approach
David Dutton, a Waterloo attorney and civil rights activist.
Dutton then contacted the UPWA international, threaterüng a
lawsuit on the women's behalf if Local No. 1 did not follow the
guidelines established by the 1964 Civil Rights Act's Title VII
prohibiting sex discrimination. UPWA international officials
promptly pressured Local No. 1 to adopt the so-called ABC
serüority plan. "A" jobs were the most physically demanding
and thus of interest mostly to men. "B" jobs—light work in
relatively clean conditions—were reserved for women. "C" jobs
were open to both men and women. When the new serüority
system was finally put into place in March 1966, however,
Ottumwa's male workers either refused to cooperate with it or
conspired to undermine women's efforts to tackle "C" jobs.
After two weeks, many women concluded that union officials
were hindering the implementation of the new plan. In April
29. For comparative statistics on the percentages of men and women workers
in midwestem meatpacking, see Warren, "The Limits of New Deal Social
Democracy," Appendix B. Dennis A. Deslippe, "'We Had an Awful Time with
Our Women': Iowa's Urüted Packinghouse Workers of America, 1945-1975,"
Journal of Women's History 5 (1993), 13-14, notes that before passage of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, women made up just 13 percent of the membership
in UPWA District 3 as opposed to 21 percent throughout the entire imion.
Ottumwa was even more thoroughly a bastion of male packing workers than
many other midwestem plants. In 1950, for instance, the Rath plant in Water-
loo employed 23 percent female workers and Armour in Mason City employed
26 percent. The Ottumwa statistics come from Ottumwa city directories for
1935, 1951, and 1957. My information on Mary Shoemaker comes from her
obituary (Ottumwa Courier, 18 February 1991). For the sexism issue, see Jesse
Merrill, interview, Ottumwa, 16 September 1981, ILHOP; and Virgil Bankson,
ILHOP interview, quoted in Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival, 231. For more
on the women's struggles at the Ottumwa plant, see Fehn, "'Chickens Come
Home to Roost,'" 335-39; and idem, "Striking Women," 276-87.
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1966 twenty-one women asked Dutton to move ahead with a
formal lawsuit vmder the Civil Rights Act's Title Vü.^ "
Less obvious to many outsiders and subsequent observers
of the battle of sexes at the Morrell plant was the local union's
concern that management, especially the union's old nemesis
Harry Hansel, hoped to use this issue to splinter the union.
After a two-year stint from 1960 to 1962 as manager of Morrell's
plant in Philadelphia, Hansel moved to the main offices in
Chicago as a member of the corporate personnel and public
relations department. In 1965-66, when the ABC plan was
debated and the women's grievances were aired, MorreU sent
Hansel to negotiate with Local No. 1 officials. Ethel Jerred,
chief steward in the sliced bacon department, later recalled that
"Harry Hansel tried to help [the women]," but union officials,
especially Merrill and Bankson, blocked his efforts. Yet Jerred
also revealed the company's lackluster commitment to the
women's efforts by noting that "the company would prefer to
hire new people from outside town rather than move women
with as much as twenty-eight years seniority" into open jobs.^ ^
Historian Dennis Deslippe has further contended that
UPWA international officers were sexist in defending the
ABC seniority plan. In Deslippe's view, UPWA President
Ralph Helstein "still embraced . . . protective labor laws for
women," since Helstein argued that women could not handle
the physical aspects of many packing jobs. The Federal District
Court in Des Moines effectively sidestepped the discrimination
debate when it threw out the women's case on a technicality.
The court then gave Morrell time to reach a settlement with
the women. On July 12,1968, the court found Morrell in com-
pliance with Title VII, and Morrell settled with each of the
twenty-one women for $450.''^
30. Fehn, "'Chickens Come Home to Roost,'" 334, 337-39; Deslippe, "'We
Had an Awful Time with Our Women,'" 17-21; Jerred, ILHOP interview;
and David J. Dutton to President, Local No. 1, UPWA-CIO, 18 April 1966,
folder 8, box 25, Local P-1 Records. Stromquist's Solidarity and Survival,
224-33, provides additional discussion of the women's battle at the Ottumwa
plant.
31. Morrell Magazine, September 1962, 3; and Jerred, ILHOP interview.
32. Deslippe, "'We Had an Awful Time with Our Women,'" 20-22.
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DESPITE ONGOING HARASSMENT from men, women
activists in Local No. 1 continued to push for greater access to
more jobs. They had some success. By the late 1960s, however,
the women's employment issue had become submerged in more
dramatic discussions about the plant's likely closing. Although
McCallum's 1954 "Morrell Days" speech had established an
ominous tone about the company's future in Ottumwa, rum-
blings among workers about the plant's possible closing did
not begin to reverberate seriously until the early 1960s. Morrell's
first threat to close the Ottumwa plant if the union did not back
off on some of its demands came during the 1961 contract nego-
tiations. The 1964 contract negotiations included similar threats.
For the Hrst time, xinion leaders also openly criticized McCallum's
financial strategy.
Who do you think you are kidding by huying all of these small
plants and hiring these people for wages that are ridiculous.
Not too long ago in a meeting with Harry Hansel, a statement
was made to the Bargaining Board, [sic] the Company was making
arrangements to transfer the work out of the Ottumwa Plant and
distribute it to other Plants. I might say this is already been [sic]
done in some instances.
Still, very few workers felt that the company would actually
close the plant. Many employees would later recall that threats
to close the plant abounded throughout the company's last
twenty years in Ottumwa, especially around contract time.
For workers hired after the early 1950s, warnings about the
possibility of a closing were standard background noise.^ ^
All this changed in 1967, when AMK, formerly American
Seal-Kap, purchased Morrell in what Fortune termed the "finan-
cial coup of 1967." As part of the largest "merger mania" in
American history since 1900 (before the even bigger "merger
mania" period that began at the end of the 1970s), the late 1960s
saw Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) acquire Wilson; Greyhound buy
out Armour; and Swift become the conglomerate Esmark by
33. Ibid., 22-23; The Bulletin, 17 September 1961 and 21 September 1964; and
Merrill, ILHOP interview. Comments about the constant threat of closing by
the early 1960s are a steady refrain in most of the interviews I have conducted
with Morrell workers as well as in the Morrell survey questions I distributed
among Morrell retirees at their annual plant closing reunion in 1982.
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buying Vickers Petroleum, Playtex, and STP in the 1960s and
'70s. AMK took over Morrell by buying 33 percent of its over-
valued stock. Eli Black, president of AMK, later claimed, "we
bought a dollar for 25 cents." Consequently, AMK, originally
a producer of milk bottle caps with sales of $40 million in 1967,
took over a company with $800 million in sales.^ *
Although McCallum's purchase of numerous small packing
plants and relocation of Morrell's headquarters from Ottumwa
to Chicago may have diverted much needed funds away from
modernizing the Ottumwa plant, at least while Morrell re-
mained independent it had not taken active steps to close the
Ottumwa plant. AMK had no such qualms, though. AMK Vice-
President Morton H. Broffman explained the company's policies
in regard to Morrell as "tough-minded management action."
President Eli Black criticized McCallum for his outdated pro-
duction planning methods and for using each of Morrell's plants
as "individual profit centers" with "no central plant control."^^
AMK's message to the Ottum^wa plant was modernize or else,
and the rank and file felt compelled to respond cooperatively-
Local union leaders initially balked when Harry Hansel came
to Ottumwa in the fall of 1969 and armounced that Morrell
would spend $6.5 million to modernize the plant if the union
would freeze its severance pay. After some debate, however,
the union finally agreed. Further dramatizing how far it had
strayed from its militant traditions, the leaders of Local P-1
34. The best source on the "merger mania" in meatpacking at the end of the
1960s is Harold B. Meyers, "For the Old Meatpackers, Things are Tough All
Over," Fortune (February 1969), 90, 134. Bennett Harrison and Barry Blue-
stone's The Creat U-Tum: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America
(New York, 1988), chap. 3, is a good source on the 1960s restructuring mania.
AMK scored an even bigger financial coup in 1968 when it purchased the giant
United Fruit Company. Eli Black and United Brand—AMK's new name after
its purchase of United Fruit—quickly fell on hard times not long after 1968.
In 1975, Black committed suicide by leaping from his New York City sky-
scraper office, apparently because of the impending scandal over his $1.25
million payment to a Honduras head of state's Swiss bank account in exchange
for a banana export tax reduction of 75 cents per box. Two weeks after news
of the scandal was released, the Honduras government toppled and United
Brand's stock fell to an all-time low. See Everybody's Business: An Irreverent
Cuide to Corporate America (San Francisco, 1980), 78-79.
35. Meyers, "For the Old Meatpackers, Things are Tough All Over," 90,134.
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(as the local was renamed after the 1968 merger of the UPWA
into the AMCBW) agreed for the first time in its history to
train their own people in time study methods so they could
abide by Morrell's modernization (and layoff) plans. In con-
trast. Jack Moses, a veteran industrial engineer at the plant,
later noted that the chief steward at Morrell's plant in Sioux
Falls, South Dakota, a longtime AMCBW stronghold, had al-
ways been trained in time studies methods. "He even checked
his own men with a stopwatch." During late 1970 and 1971,
the Ottumwa local also agreed to company plans for wholesale
layoffs in the sliced bacon, canning, beef, and pork divisions.
About six hundred people were laid off in the pork division
alone in 1971.'^
By early 1973, however, word was out that the Ottumwa
plant would close in July. Jesse Merrill and Harold Trimble,
chief steward in 1973, conveyed their utter frustration with
Morrell and its new president, Elias Paul, in a frank letter to
Patrick Gorman, secretary-treasurer of the AMCBW.
In 1970, we thought, the Company was sincere in trying to make
the plant go, so we conceded to freeze our severance pay rate and
credited service at the 1970 level, only to find out their intentions
weren't honorable. We gave them 11 percent more kill, cutting
of hogs [that is, a faster pace in the kill and cut departments],
beef with modernization, and lost people besides. God knows we
tried and we find him [Paul] crying on your shoulder for more
concessions. . . . If people like him make it to heaven, than [sic]
we know there is no one in hell and it is a myth.
Gorman responded in patronizing fashion. Paul "was not crying
on my shoulder," he replied; he seemed sincerely saddened by
the imminent closing. Gorman suggested, moreover, that Merrill
and Trimble should be ashamed for writing him in a way that
suggested that they did not "care a hoot whether the plant
closes or not." Paul's letter to Gorman was even more revealing.
Although Paul noted in passing his "concern about the impact
on the employees at Ottumwa and the impact on the town of
36. The Bulletin, 24 February, 23 and 30 November 1970, 8 February and 9
April 1971; Jack Moses, interview with author, 12 September 1982 (notes in
author's possession); and Merrill, ILHOP interview.
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Ottumwa" if the plant closed, he went on to excuse Morrell of
ultimate responsibility for its demise.
John Morrell and Co. has been taking money from other loca-
tions for niost of these past twenty-five years and putting it into
Ottumvy^ a in an attempt to tum the [plant's losses] around. There
is little point in pursuing the wisdom of this past action at this
later date, but I believe we all would agree the company has tried
hard to solve a difficult problem. I'm sure that Üie company's
patience with this trying situation has always been tempered by
the effects that any drastic action would have had on the welfare
of the commurüty and on the individual employees involved.^ ''
One is left to wonder about the precise meaning of Paul's state-
ment about the "company's patience with this trying situation."
Yet it seems likely that in part he was castigating Ottumwa's
militant union tradition.
TO THIS DAY, veterans of Ottumwa's long post-World War II
labor-management struggles continue to debate the real reasons
for the plant's closing. Many management and imion leaders
agree that by the 1960s the Ottumwa plant was clearly outdated
in terms of design efficiency. Lawrence Reedquist, a longtime
traffic engineer, emphasized the irony that Morrell had built
the plant to last "one hundred years" without knowing that by
the 1960s new-line packing companies such as Iowa Beef Pro-
cessors were building plants to last "no more than 40 years."
Although it was equipped with the most up-to-date system of
elevators and internal conveyance systems, the Ottumwa plant
by the 1960s consisted of dozens of separate, mulfistory build-
ings that defied modern processes of packing disassembly.
Many workers had to be employed simply to truck products
between the various buildings. Still, Jack Moses, another long-
time Morrell supervisor, pointed to Morrell's continued opera-
tion of its (now seriously downsized) packing plant in Sioux
Falls. There, with buildings nearly as old as the Ottumwa fa-
cility, Morrell continues to turn out millions of dollars worth
of meat products. As Mickey Lauria and Peter S. Fisher point
37. Merrill and Trimble to Gorman, 6 May 1973; Gorman to Merrill and Trimble,
11 May 1973; Paul to Gorman, 24 April 1973, box 11, Local P-1 Records.
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out in their study of plant closings in Iowa, "any given plant
cannot be said to be obsolete in any absolute sense; it could be
made efficient at some cost." Moses, as well as many former
Ottumwa workers, believed Morrell kept the Sioux Falls plant
open because its AMCBW-affiliated work force had long been
more cooperative on production issues.^*
An examination of the specific causes of the Ottumwa
plant's ultimate demise would be fodder for another study.
Nevertheless, it appears plausible that the erosion of workers'
militancy allowed Morrell to decide the fate of the plant with-
out much opposition. Local P-l's internal divisions and the
complacency this created meant that workers were unable to
apply much pressure on Morrell or city authorities to do much
to keep the plant open. In 1969 Local P-1 and other Ottumwa
union members formed the Greater Ottumwa Labor Develop-
ment (GOLD) Corporation to push for greater involvement by
labor in Morrell's future as well as in the city's post-Morrell
plans. Yet by 1972 GOLD members complained that their occa-
sional requests for information and input had usually been ig-
nored by city and corporate authorities. Ottumwa's predicament
contrasted noticeably with Waterloo's case in the late 1970s.
There, public officials and local union members worked dili-
gently to keep the Rath packing plant open.^'
Local P-l's internal discord generated considerable bitter-
ness among workers once the plant closed. Just as many former
management personnel claimed, some of those who joined the
union in the post-World War II years, such as Jack McCoy and
Jesse Merrill, blamed the militant unionists for the plant's fate.
38. Reedquist, interview with author; Moses, interview with author; and
Mickey Lauria and Peter S. Fisher, Plant Closings in Iowa: Causes, Consequences,
and Legislative Options (Iowa City, 1983), 52. Chap. 5, pp. 41-64, of Lauria and
Fisher's study deals specifically with the meatpacking industry. Among the
1982 Morrell surveys I collected, Elizabeth J. "Sue" Smith gave credence to
the Sioux Falls "theory" by noting how she had been told that Morrell closed
the wrong plant.
39. GOLD'S Newsletter (Greater Ottumwa Labor Development Corporation),
c. March 1972, box 11, Local P-1 Records; Gene Redmon, Chuck Mueller, and
Gene Daniels, "A Lost Dream: Worker Control at Rath Packing," Labor Research
Review, 5-23; John Portz, "An 'Offset' Response: Waterloo, Iowa, and the Rath
Packing Company," in The Politics of Plant Closings (Lawrence, KS, 1990), 54-84.
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While appreciative of the role the local's militancy had played
in establishing significant gains for its members, McCoy and
Merrill felt that the militants' quest for their own sense of justice
and fairness had jeopardized the long-term viability of the plant.
These declarations of blame can be dismissed as overly simplis-
tic, but they do confirm the importance of internal divisions in
the experience of Morrell-Ottumwa workers after the early 1950s.
Cultural homogeneity and a common sense of community ex-
perience had given the early local union much of its strength.
That underpinning eroded in the face of Morrell's continued
onslaught on workers' power within the plant, the company's
recruitment of rural w^orkers who were primarily concemed
with putting bread on the table rather than battling an unjust
company, and struggles between men and women over declin-
ing job opportunities in the face of massive changes in the in-
dustry. As a result, Morrell-Ottumwa's workers lost not only
their militant union but their jobs as well.

